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Blackwater's
New
Battlefield:
Toward a Regulatory Regime in
the United States for Privately
Armed Contractors Operating at
Sea
"[W]hen evil is the only solution, you do evil."1
Shamun Indhabur, Somali Pirate Leader

ABSTRACT

Piracy has reemerged with a vengeance in the twenty-first
century. Although it is confined primarily to the horn of Africa,
piracy poses a significant problem to commercial shipping
companies that need to traverse the Gulf of Aden for business. In
response to modern-day piracy, shipowners have begun to
employ privately armed contractors for protection. Countries
and international organizations have recently developed
regulations to address this growth in private maritime security.
This Note analyzes both internationaland domestic regulatory
regimes for privately armed contractors with a specific focus on
the United States and Norway. This Note concludes that current
U.S. regulations are inadequate and do not sufficiently restrain
the use of force by private contractorswhen combatingpirates at
sea. Consequently, this Note recommends that the United States
Coast Guard (USCG) use its administrativeauthority to publish
binding rules of engagement for private contractors defending
U.S. -flagged vessels.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"I'll give you a weapons free when ready[,] just stand by," barks
the private security commander to his comrade.2 The two men are
armed with assault rifles and standing guard aboard the Avocet, a
merchant vessel traversing the Indian Ocean. 3 The Trident Group
security commander has just spotted an approaching skiff, likely
filled with pirates, and is preparing his team's attack. 4 "Go ahead
warning shots," shouts the commander as he exits the bridge of the
vessel and takes up a shooting position overlooking the water. 5
Immediately, the second guard begins firing his rifle in rapid
succession at the pirates' small craft. 6 There is no delay between the
"warning" shot and the suppressive fire. 7 The pirates have not fired a
single shot, and, under a heavy volley of fire, they collide into the
Avocet. 8 The contractors continue to engage the pirate's skiff from the
advantageous position offered by the deck of the ship. 9 The pirate

2.
hogfeederyahoo, Pirate Attack Somalia Defeated-Pirates Shot off the
Somalia Coast, YOUTUBE (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
lalKZOllt-Y [hereinafter Pirate Attack]. The U.S. Army defines weapons free as a
"weapon control order imposing a status whereby weapons systems may be fired at any
target not positively recognized as friendly." HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE ARMY,
OPERATIONAL TERMS AND GRAPHICS 1-6 (2004). The proper command given the pirates'
approach of the maritime vessel in the Pirate Attack video was "weapons hold," not
"weapons free." See id. (defining weapons hold as "a weapon control order imposing a
status whereby weapons systems may only be fired in self-defense or in response to a
formal order"); Pirate Attack, supra (demonstrating that the pirates did not fire one
shot at the security contractors prior to the contractors firing numerous shots at the
pirates). Also, this video is reminiscent of Blackwater's firefight in Baghdad, Iraq, on
September 16, 2007, which killed seventeen Iraqi civilians. See Theodore T. Richard,
Reconsidering the Letter of Marque: Utilizing Private Security Providers Against
Piracy, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 411, 454 (2010) (noting agreement between the United
States and Iraq that the Blackwater contractors used excessive force in Iraq).
3.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann & Alan Katz, Shooting to Kill Pirates Risks
Blackwater Moment, BLOOMBERG (May 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201205-08/shooting-to-kill-pirates-risks-blackwater-moment.html.
4.
Id.; Pirate Attack, supra note 2. It appears from the video that the
commander is allowing the pirate skiff to approach as close as possible to the Avocet
before engaging the pirates.
PirateAttack, supra note 2.
5.

6.

Id.

7.
See id. (depicting a rapid succession of shots from the private guard after
the commander's order for a warning shot). Based on this author's experience as a
platoon leader in Afghanistan in 2009, the use of warning shots in combat operations is
typically inappropriate for two reasons. First, there are other nonlethal methods as
effective as warning shots that can force a suspected enemy combatant (in many
situations it is difficult to accurately determine if an individual is an enemy combatant)
to comply. Second, warning shots can result in death when deadly force is not
necessarily authorized.
Id.
8.
9.
See id. (showing the contractors leaning over the starboard side of the ship
and discharging their firearms directly into the pirates' skiff).
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vessel falls behind the Avocet but is continually engaged by the team
commander until it is out of sight. 0 Trident Group, the U.S.-based
employer of both guards on the Avocet, later admitted that the
firefight likely claimed the lives of some of the pirates.
This clash between private contractors and pirates occurred on
March 25, 2011, in the Indian Ocean, but it is not an isolated incident
in this region of the world. 12 In fact, these types of confrontations
have become much more frequent with the steady rise in piracy off
the coast of Somalia.'8 In 2012 alone, Somali pirates attacked over
seventy vessels. 14 In 2013, there were thirteen piracy-related
incidents with two reported hijackings. 15 Although these numbers
represent a significant decrease from recent years-such as 2009,
when pirates conducted 217 attacks, captured 867 hostages, and
hijacked 47 vessels-piracy is still a major threat in this part of the
world.16 In response to these attacks and hijackings, the shipping
industry has begun employing private maritime security companies
(PMSCs). 17 PMSCs provide privately contracted armed security
personnel (PCASP) to defend merchant vessels traversing piratefilled waters.' 8 To date, no ship employing PCASP has been hijacked,

10.
Id.
11.
See Bockmann & Katz, supra note 3 (highlighting the statement of Trident
Group's president, Thomas Rothrauff, that "[a]t least some of the boats' occupants were
probably killed or injured").
12.
See id. (noting the lack of rules regarding "how much force is legal and
necessary to fight Somali piracy attacks, which targeted a record 237 ships last year").
13.
See Koji Sekimizu, Sec'y-Gen., Int'l Maritime Org., Opening Address at the
Maritime Safety Committee's 90th Session: High-level Segment on Arms on Board
(May 16, 2012) (transcript available online at http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/
SecretaryGeneral/Secretary-GeneralsSpeechesToMeetings/Pages/msc90highlevel.aspx)
(noting that piracy has been a problem off the coast of Somalia for 5 years but that the
proportion of successful attacks has decreased recently, possibly due to shipowners use
of PCASP).
14.
IMB Reports Drop in Somali Piracy, But Warns Against Complacency, INT'L
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/811-imb-reportsdrop-in-somali-piracy-but-warns-against-complacency [hereinafter Drop in Piracy]. The
article indicates that piracy off the coast of Somalia is dropping but still remains a
significant problem.
15.
Piracy & Armed Robbery News & Figures, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures (last visited Dec. 19,
2013) [hereinafter Piracy Statistics].
16.
See Richard, supra note 2, at 418 (discussing the pirates' success in 2008
and 2009).
17.
Int'l Maritime Org., Interim Guidance to Private Maritime Security
Companies ProvidingPrivately ContractedArmed Security Personnel on Board Ships
in the High Risk Area, Annex § 1.1, IMO MSC.1/Circ.1443 (May 25, 2012) [hereinafter
IMO Guidance to PCASPJ, available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/
PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/MSC.1-Circ.1443.pdf.
Id.
18.
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providing considerable incentive for merchant vessels to utilize
contractor services.1 9
The rise of PCASP operating aboard merchant vessels poses a
number of unanswered legal questions. 2 0 There are currently no
legally binding international regulations governing PCASP. 21
Additionally, PMSCs and PCASP are not required to report to any
international organization. 22 PCASP do have to follow the laws of the
state whose flag the ship flies while on board a vessel, but many
nations have very limited regulations for them. 23 One of the major
concerns is that PMSCs will operate in countries with the least
restrictive laws in order to avoid the cost of compliance with stringent
regulations. 24 This possibility is particularly disturbing since the
number of pirates that private contractors have killed at sea is
unknown. 25 Trident Group's disproportionate use of force against a
small band of pirates supports this startling reality and indicates a

19.
See, e.g., David Isenberg, The Rise of Private Maritime Security Companies,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidisenberg/private-military-contractors_b_1548523.html (explaining that the demand for
PMSCs is due to the fact that "no ship with armed security has been successfully
hijacked"); Laws and Guns: Armed Guards on Ships Deter Pirates.But Who Says They
Are Legal?, THE EcONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21552553
[hereinafter Laws and Guns] (noting that "[n]o ship carrying armed guards has so far
been hijacked"); Thom Shanker, U.S. Reports that Piracy off Africa Has Plunged, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/world/africa/piracy-aroundhorn-of-africa-has-plunged-us-says.html (declaring that "no vessel with ... a [private
maritime security] team on board has been hijacked"); Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant
Sec'y, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Remarks to the Defense Trade Advisory
Group (Nov. 9, 2011) (transcript available online at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/
176925.htm) (stating that "to date no ship with an armed security team aboard has
been successfully pirated").
20.
See Alan Cowell, In First, Private Guards Kill Somali Pirate, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
24,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/worldlafrica/25pirate.html
(quoting Arvinder Sambei, a lawyer at the UN's antipiracy program, asking
rhetorically "[w]ho are [the PMSCs] responsible to?"); Sekimizu, supra note 13
(discussing the lack of a uniform policy or even minimum performance standards for
PCASP across member governments).
21.
IMO Guidanceto PCASP, supra note 17, at Annex § 1.1.
22.
See Isenberg, supra note 19 (noting that PMSCs have "no obligation to file
public reports").
23.
See IMO Guidance to PCASP, supra note 17, at Annex § 1.2 (recognizing
that flag states ultimately have the choice as to whether to allow PCASP aboard ships);
Comparison of FlagState Laws on Armed Guards and Arms on Board, INT'L CHAMBER
OF SHIPPING (June 2012), http://www.ics-shipping.org/ICS-ECSA%2OPrivate%20Armed%
20Guards%20Flag/o20State%2OLaws%2OJune%202012.pdf [hereinafter Comparison of
FlagState Laws] (listing various nations' requirements for PMSCs and PCASP).
24.
See Laws and Guns, supra note 19 (noting that PMSCs could respond to
regulation in one country by moving to another country with a less restrictive regime).
25.
See id. (reporting that human rights groups are advocating for regulations
for PMSCs because "[u]nknown numbers of Somali pirates have been killed at sea since
2005").
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need in the United States for legally binding use of force standards
for private maritime contractors. 26
Maritime officials agree that PCASP need to be regulated
because there is a "glaring absence of regulation," domestically and
internationally. 2 7 Commentators worry that governments are relying
on self-regulation, goodwill, and luck to manage the explosive growth
in the maritime security industry.2 8 This indifference is especially
distressing when only 26 percent of civilian ships traversing pirateinfested waters disclose the use of PCASP but estimates indicate that
approximately 50 percent of ships utilize private security services. 29
Governments, the public, and the shipping industry have recognized
that PCASP-as armed groups of privateers-need to be properly
regulated. 30 The International Maritime Organization's (IMO)
secretary-general, Koji Sekimizu, has challenged the international
community to consider how to deal with the issue of PCASP. 3
Secretary-General Sekimizu notes that the maritime industry is a
global industry, which means that domestic policies have
international consequences. 32 As a result, individual nationsincluding the United States-must make a detailed and
comprehensive domestic policy on PCASP a priority.
Part II of this Note discusses modern-day piracy and the
methods pirates use to attack and hijack merchant vessels. It also
describes the parts of the world where piracy thrives and the
26.
See Bockmann & Katz, supra note 3 (asking "how much force is legal and
necessary to fight Somali piracy attacks"); Pirate Attack, supra note 2 (depicting a
firefight where the pirates did not fire one shot at the armed guards).
27.
See Urmila Venugopalan, How To Fight Piracy (and How Not To), CNN
WORLD (Sept. 27, 2012, 1:55 PM), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/09/27/
how-to-fight-piracy-and-how-not-to/ (discussing the need for greater regulation of
PMSCs from flag states).
28.
See James Brown, Pirates and Privateers: Managing the Indian Ocean's
Private Security Boom, LowY
INST. FOR INT'L POL'Y (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/pirates-and-privateers-managing-indianoceans-private-security-boom (noting that "[glovernment policy, international
organisations and international law" have not evolved quickly enough to respond to the
increase in the shipping industry's use of PMSCs).
29.
See id. (citing MARITIME PRIVATE SECURITY: MARKET RESPONSES TO
PIRACY, TERRORISM, AND WATERBORNE SECURITY RISKS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 6
(Claude Berube et al. eds., 2012)) (noting that anecdotal reports suggest that "perhaps
half' of civilian ships in the Gulf of Aden are utilizing PCASP on board). The author
notes that the 26 percent statistic originated from a study of German ships that
declared the use of PCASP. Id. at n.23. In contrast, the 50 percent statistic is the result
of "[o]ther sources" that "provide scant evidence." Id.
30.
See Isenberg, supra note 19 (discussing the growing concern among the
"public, government and industry" that this armed force needs to be regulated).
31.
See Sekimizu, supra note 13 ("This High-level segment was designed to
discuss the current policy issue of private armed guards ... .").
32.
See id. ("As a truly global industry with many stakeholders, shipping
benefits from harmonization of procedures, adoption of common minimum standards
and clarity with respect to national legal regimes.").
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background of the men who resort to piracy to make a living. This
Note then considers the international community's and shipowners'
responses to the reemergence of piracy and concludes that the
budgetary limits of Western navies will force shipowners to use
private contractors for protection well into the future. Following this
discussion, this Note briefly addresses the rise of private maritime
security by examining the methods and backgrounds of PCASP.
Part III of this Note analyzes the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its applicability to PCASP
combating piracy. Since UNCLOS is rather limited in addressing this
issue, this Note then examines the implications of the IMO's guidance
to PMSCs, shipowners, and flag states regarding the use of private
contractors to protect ships from pirates. Part III then compares the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the various rules for the use of
force (RUF) guidelines promulgated by the United States and
Norway. Ultimately, this Note concludes that Norway has the most
comprehensive and stringent RUF for PCASP.
Part IV begins with an explanation of why the United States
must revise its current RUF for PCASP. This Note recommends that
the United States Coast Guard (USCG) publish legally binding RUF
guidelines for U.S.-based PCASP modeled after Norway's regulations.
These guidelines will restrict PCASP's use of force to what is strictly
necessary. This Note also recommends that all PMSCs receive outside
certification by an international organization. This certification will
ensure that U.S.-flagged vessels only employ competent and
professional PCASP. Norway's regulatory regime will serve as the
primary framework for Part IV's proposal with an analysis of the
advantages and disadvantages of this solution. Ultimately, the
proposed regulatory framework ensures that U.S-based PCASP act
with a respect for human rights and international law when
protecting merchant vessels at sea.
II. THE REEMERGENCE OF PIRACY

A. Modern-Day Piracy:Blackbeard's New Business Model
UNCLOS defines piracy as "any illegal acts of violence or
detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by
the crew or the passengers of a private ship . . . on the high
seas . . . ." This definition has near universal acceptance in the

international community, even among nations that have not adopted

33.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
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UNCLOS. 34 For example, the United States is not a party to
UNCLOS, but the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Dire, held that
UNCLOS properly defined piracy "as customary international law"
and interpreted the United States' definition of piracy, in 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1651, in accordance with UNCLOS's definition. 35 The court
reasoned that Congress's intent was to ensure piracy was a universal
jurisdiction crime that evolved with the law of nations. 36 Thus,
UNCLOS-as customary international law-defines piracy for the
United States and most other nations in the world.3 7
Modern-day piracy tends to be limited to certain parts of the
world referred to as high-risk areas (HRAs). 38 These HRAs-depicted
in Appendix I-cover four million square kilometers and affect
maritime routes that are "critical to global commerce."3 9 The Gulf of
Aden, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Sea are notable HRAs with pirates
hailing from nearby coastal nations, such as Somalia and Yemen. 40
The combination of poverty, weak governments, and maritime
commerce in these areas enables piracy to flourish. 4 1 For example,
piracy in Somalia is an outgrowth of the country's instability and the

See United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 459, 461-62 (4th Cir. 2012). The
34.
Fourth Circuit noted that UNCLOS has 162 States Party of the 192 member states of
the United Nations. Id. at 459. Furthermore, the court found that "UNCLOS's
definition of general piracy has a normcreating character ... that is binding on even
those nations that are not a party to the Convention." Id. at 462.
Id. at 459, 468-69 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012)) (holding that the lower
35.
court properly defined piracy in accordance with UNCLOS). For a discussion of why the
United States is not a party to UNCLOS, see infra Part III.A.
36.
Id. at 469.
Id. (quoting S.C. Res. 2020, 1 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011))
37.
("Resolution 2020 reaffirmed 'that international law, as reflected in the [UNCLOS],
sets out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at
sea.').
38.
See BMP4: BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST
SOMALIA BASED PIRACY: SUGGESTED PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICES FOR SHIP
OPERATORS AND MASTERS OF SHIPS TRANSITING THE HIGH RISK AREA 4 (Witherby
Publ'g Grp. Ltd., 4th ed. 2011) [hereinafter BMP4] (defining the HRAs as places "where
pirate activity and/or attacks have taken place").
39.
See James Brown, Piracy and the Private Security Boom, THE
INTERPRETER: Lowy INST. FOR INT'L POL'Y (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:45 AM),
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/09/12/Piracy-and-the-private-securityboom.aspx ("The high-risk area for piracy sits astride maritime trade routes critical to
global commerce."); Venugopalan, supra note 27 (noting that pirate activity covers an
area "one and a half times the size of mainland Europe"); see infra Appendix I.
40.
See Venugopalan, supra note 27 (arguing that international naval forces
combating Somali-based piracy have forced the pirates beyond "the Gulf of Aden and
into the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean"); see infra Appendix I.
41.
See Radio Interview by Carrie Johnson with John Campbell, Former
Ambassador to Nigeria, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/16/134585495/U-S-Courts-Dust-Off-High-Seas-Piracy-Laws
(discussing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia).
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relative immunity Somali authorities grant senior pirate leaders. 4 2
Somali individuals have a life expectancy of approximately 50 years
and an average yearly income of $600, incentivizing young Somali
males to become pirates as a way of providing for their families. 43
Somali pirate leader Shamun Indhabur noted in a 2008 interview
with reporter Rod Nordland, "[W]hen evil is the only solution, you do
evil." 44 Therefore, countries like Somalia provide a perfect recipe of
socioeconomic and governmental failures that enable piracy to thrive
in its coastal waters. 45
Pirates' methods for seizing merchant vessels are crude but
effective. They approach ships in small, motorized skiffs armed with
AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades. 46 The pirates use ladders or
ropes to board ships and then quickly move to the command centerthe bridge-to gain control of the vessel. 4 7 Attacks typically last
thirty minutes, but the kidnapped members of the crew can face
around five months of involuntary detention on the Somali
mainland. 48 In fact, the appeal of piracy is not the cargo on board the
ships, but rather the millions of dollars in ransoms that can be
extorted from shipowners for kidnapped crews. 49 In 2011 alone,

42.
See Somali PirateKingpins Enjoy "Impunity" U.N. Experts, REUTERS (July
18, 2012, 4:47 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/18/us-somalia-un-piracyidUSBRE86GOZN20120718 [hereinafter Pirate Kingpins] (reporting that a Somaliafocused UN Monitoring Group claimed that Somali authorities were protecting senior
pirate leaders from arrest and prosecution).
43.
The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html
(last visited Dec. 20, 2013)
(estimating the total population's life expectancy at birth at 50.8 years and the per
capita GDP at $600 dollars); see John Hackwood, Civilian Contractors:Life of a Ship
Anti-Piracy Operator-Eight Weeks on the High Seas, ISENBERG INST. OF STRATEGIC
SATIRE (Mar. 20, 2012), http://iissonline.net/?p=316 ("If I lived [in Somalia] I would
probably be a pirate too, they have families to feed just like everyone else."). See
generally Douglas A. McIntyre, Somali Pirates Are Getting Rich: A Look at the Profit
Margins, TIME BUSINESS & MONEY (Apr. 15, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/
business/article/0,8599,1891386,00.html ('The pirate business is not going away. It is
too profitable.").
44.
Nordland, supra note 1; see James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Piracy
Repression, Partneringand the Law, 40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 43, 44 (2009) (discussing
Somalia's socioeconomics as a cause of piracy in the region).
45.
See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
46.
See BMP4, supra note 38, at 9-10 (describing skiffs as small, open boats
capable of speeds up to twenty-five knots and noting that pirates use small arms
weapons and rocket-propelled grenades).
47.
Id. at 10.
48.
See Brown, Pirates and Privateers,supra note 28 (noting that 158 days is
the average detention of a captured ship and crew).
See Hackwood, supra note 43 (arguing that Somali pirates do not kill
49.
hostages because "a dead crew isn't good for the subsequent ransom dealings with the
ship's owners").
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pirates netted $146 million in ransoms. 5 0 The pirates use Somali
investors, negotiators, and currency specialists to facilitate the
payment of ransoms. 5 1 Once a ransom is paid, pirates almost always
return the hostages physically unharmed, which gives their position
credibility during a negotiation.52 The Somali pirates arguably view
themselves as "businessmen" profiting from the lack of security on
board these merchant vessels.5 3
B. Shipowners in a War Zone: The Costs of Piracy and
the Benefits of PCASP
Shipowners' response to piracy in the HRAs has been to employ
PCASP for security. 54 This decision is justifiable under basic costbenefit analysis. Although only 1 percent of the world's ships traverse
the Somali coast, this is equal to over 33,000 vessels, and current
estimates place the cost of piracy to the shipping industry at around
$5 billion. 55 This astronomical cost is driven partly by rising
insurance premiums for ships operating in the HRAs. 56 Many
insurance companies classify the HRAs as "war-risk zone[s]" and
have increased insurance premiums to reflect the dangers posed by

50.
Brown, Pirates and Privateers,supra note 28 (describing the piracy model
as highly profitable with a total of $146 million secured in ransoms in 2011); see also
Richard, supra note 2, at 419 (noting that "Somali pirates took in between $30 and
$150 million in ransom payments in 2008").
51.
See Brown, Pirates and Privateers,supra note 28. Mr. Brown describes the
Somali pirates as "highly sophisticated" and notes that they use both currency
specialists and investors to facilitate their activities. Id.
52.
See Hackwood, supra note 43 (claiming that if captured by pirates one can
expect "an uncomfortable stay in a Puntland port" but noting that Somali pirates view
the crew "as their most valuable asset").
53.
See Brown, Pirates and Privateers,supra note 28 (discussing the success of
the "piracy business model" and noting that profits from piracy have actually driven a
housing boom in Somalia); Hackwood, supra note 43 (describing the pirates as
businessmen).
54.
See Laws and Guns, supra note 19 (stating that PCASP serve on
approximately 40 percent of merchant vessels in the HRAs); Sekimizu, supra note 13
(reporting that naval forces estimate that approximately 25 percent of ships in the
HRAs are carrying firearms but qualifying that percentage by noting that many ships
are not declaring the use of PCASP).
55.
See Dana M. Parsons, Protecting the Booty: Creating a Regulatory
Framework to Govern Increased Use of PrivateSecurity Companies in the Fight Against
Pirates,35 TUL. MAR. L.J. 153, 155-56 (2010) (noting that piracy "has cost commercial
shippers millions"); Richard, supra note 2, at 421 ("Although Somali piracy only affects
one percent of worldwide shipping, over 33,000 vessels annually transit the Gulf of
Aden."); Shanker, supra note 19 (reporting that commercial shipping officials claim
that piracy adds $5 billion a year to its expenses); see also PirateKingpins, supra note
42 (reporting that piracy costs the world economy approximately $7 billion).
56.
See Brown, Pirates and Privateers,supra note 28 (arguing that one of the
key factors that drove shipping companies to employ PCASP was "the rising costs of
insurance"); Shanker, supra note 19 (noting that insurance expenses represent a
portion of the $5 billion cost of piracy to the shipping industry).
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piracy. 57 Underwriters, however, reduce insurance premiums for
shipping companies that utilize PCASP. 58 Other nontrivial costs
associated with successful pirate hijackings include the millions of
dollars in ransoms that shipping companies must pay as well as the
lost chartering income.59 In contrast, a four-man PCASP team costs
an average of $45,000 to provide security for a ship through an
HRA. 60 Moreover, pirates have not successfully hijacked a ship
employing PCASP. 61 Consequently, armed private contractors
present a fiscally sound solution to the problem of piracy for
shipowners.62
Since shipowners have begun to use the services of PCASP,
piratical attacks have significantly declined off the horn of Africa. 63
Commentators credit both the international community's military
response as well as shipowners' use of PCASP. 64 However, PCASP
will likely bear the burden of combating piracy in the future. 65 Many
European governments are facing budget cuts that will limit their
counterpiracy activities in the HRAs. 66 The size of the HRAs also

57.
See Brown, Pirates and Privateers, supra note 28 ("Since 2008 the Lloyd's
Joint War Committee, a coordinating body of Lloyds London underwriters, has
designated Indian Ocean piracy regions as a 'war-risk zone', increasing insurance
premiums for ships that transit.").
58.
Id.
59.
See id. (noting that the average ransom for a kidnapped crew is $4.58
million and "[s]hipping companies lose millions in foregone chartering income while
their ship is held to ransom").
60.
Laws and Guns, supra note 19.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
61.
62.
See Venugopalan, supra note 27 (noting that PCASP are a "prudent
investment" for the shipping industry).
63.
Shanker, supra note 19 (reporting that data released by the U.S. Navy
shows a significant decline in acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia in 2012). Compare
Drop in Piracy, supra note 14 (reporting seventy total incidents in Somalia as of
September 2012), with Shanker, supra note 19 (reporting 222 piratical attacks of which
34 were successful in 2011 and 239 piratical attacks of which 68 were successful in
2010 off the coast of Somalia).
64.
See, e.g., BMP4, supra note 38, at 3 ("The presence of NavallMilitary forces
in the Gulf of Aden . . . has significantly reduced the incidence of piracy attack [sic] in
this area."); Shanker, supra note 19 (noting that the decrease in attacks witnessed in
2012 is attributable to both "aggressive patrolling by international forces" and PCASP);
Venugopalan, supra note 27 (crediting international navies for the reduction in piracy
off the coast of Somalia in 2012 as well as PCASP); cf. Brown, Pirates and Privateers,
supra note 28 (noting that it is unclear why hijackings have dropped in 2012 but
crediting PMSCs as a possible reason).
65.
See Brown, Pirates and Privateers, supra note 28 (noting that both
European and U.S. navies are facing "resource constraints" that will limit their
counterpiracy operations in the future).
66.
See id. ("European navies particularly are concerned about the impact of
ongoing piracy operations on their defence budgets, and have either reduced their
counter-piracy commitments or are looking to do so."); Venugopalan, supra note 27
(arguing that "fiscal austerity and budget constraints" will make it near impossible for
the international naval community to effectively combat piracy).
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makes it difficult for national militaries to protect the many
commercial vessels traversing those waters. 67 The reality of countries'
budget cuts coupled with the efficacy of PCASP at preventing
piratical attacks means that shipowners will continue to turn to
private security contractors for protection. 68
Piracy on the high seas presents a profitable business
opportunity for PMSCs. 69 Maritime security is currently a billion
dollar per year industry that has over 140 companies employing
approximately 2,700 armed guards.7 0 Since 2000, security contractors
have attempted to suppress modern-day piracy in the HRAs. 71
PMSCs, including Hart and Trident Group, pride themselves on
providing experienced contractors to defend merchant vessels.7 2 The
industry is experiencing high annual revenue growth likely as a
result of the large contracts PMSCs are signing with commercial
shipping companies.73 A typical PCASP team consists of three to six
men armed with AK-47s and machine guns.74 The armed contractors
have an assortment of sophisticated equipment including night vision
goggles, medical kits, satellite communications, and body armor. 75
Many of these contractors have prior private security experience in

See Shapiro, supra note 19 (stating that international naval forces have a
67.
difficult time protecting commercial vessels from piracy in such a large area); Brown,
Pirates and Privateers, supra note 28 (comparing the international community's
counterpiracy efforts to that of "'a police car patrolling an area the size of France').
68.
See supra notes 19, 63-67 and accompanying text.
69.
See Isenberg, supra note 19 (referring to the PMSC industry as a "[b]oom
[m]arket" where "there is good money to be made").
70.
See id. (noting that PMSC operations in the Gulf of Aden alone net a billion
dollars a year); Venugopalan, supra note 27 (reporting that the Lowy Institute
estimates the recent formation of 140 PMSC companies employing approximately 2,700
armed guards to meet the shipping industry's demand for security on the high seas).
71.
See Richard, supra note 2, at 443-44 (discussing the different PMSCs the
Puntland government has employed). The Somali government utilized Hart between
2000 and 2001 'to protect Puntland's maritime resources against illegal foreign fishing
by providing training as well as on-ship support to the local Coast Guard."' Id. at 443.
Thus, merchant vessels are not the only market for PMSCs' services.
72.
See
When
You
Face
Risk,
You
Need
Hart,
HART,
http://www.hartsecurity.com/group-profile (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter
HART] ("On the seas you will find Hart maritime security operatives protecting
commercial vessels as they pass through pirated waters.. . ."); Maritime Security and
Training-TridentGroup, TRIDENT GROUP, http://www.gotridentgroup.com (last visited
Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter TRIDENT] ("The Trident Group is recognized as the US
Market Leader in Anti-Piracy & Maritime Security Operations World-Wide."). For a
more in depth discussion of maritime PMSCs, see Michael L. Mineau, Pirates,
Blackwater and Maritime Security: The Rise of Private Navies in Response to Modern
Piracy, 9 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 63, 66-69 (2010) (discussing various maritime PMSCs).
73.
See Brown, Pirates and Privateers, supra note 28 ("Maritime PMSCs are
experiencing high annual revenue growth in counter-piracy and are signing larger
contracts.").
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
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both Iraq and Afghanistan. 76 At $500 to $1,000 per day, there is a
significant financial incentive to serve as an armed contractor-if one
has the necessary expertise, background, and courage.7 7 As long as
piracy remains a danger on the high seas, PMSCs will find the
commercial shipping industry a viable market for their security
services.7 8

III. AN

ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
REGULATORY REGIMES FOR PCASP

A. UNCLOS
UNCLOS provides a "comprehensive regime of law and order"
that establishes basic rules for nations' uses of the ocean and its
resources. 79 After more than a decade of detailed and intense
international discussions, UNCLOS codified the existing rules of the
sea and was adopted on December 12, 1982, in Jamaica. 80 The treaty
has 162 States Party and serves as the global regime for addressing
ocean-related issues. 8 1 The goal of the treaty was to create "'an
effective international regime over the seabed and the ocean floor
beyond a clearly defined national jurisdiction." 8 2 UNCLOS, however,
is limited in that it only governs those nations that decide to join it. 83
The United States is not a party to UNCLOS due primarily to its
concern with the treaty's seabed-mining provisions. 84 The United
States has signed the treaty, but the Senate has not ratified it.85 The
major U.S. criticisms of UNCLOS include (1) subjecting the United
States to the authority of an international body; (2) requiring U.S.
corporations "to pay royalties for resource exploitation"; and (3)
76.
Isenberg, supra note 19.
77.
See Brown, Pirates and Privateers, supra note 28 (noting that individual
contractors can earn $500 per day, while PMSCs can charge up to $1000 per day for a
contractor).
78.
See supranotes 69-77 and accompanying text.
79.
30 Years Since Law of the Sea Convention Opened for Signature, NEWS &
MEDIA UNITED NATIONS RADIO 4:25 (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.unmultimedia.org/
radio/english/2012/03/30-years-since-law-of-the-sea-convention-opened-for-signature/
(interviewing Under-Secretary-General Patricia O'Brien, UN legal counsel, about the
importance of UNCLOS).
80.
Id. at 0:26, 2:33 (noting that UNCLOS did not enter into force until
November 16, 1994).
Id. at 3:34, 3:51.
81.
82.
Id. at 2:10 (quoting Mr. Avrid Pardo, Malta's Ambassador to the United
Nations, on November 1, 1967).
See id. at 9:27 (noting that UNCLOS is a "club that one must join").
83.
See United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 459 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing United
84.
States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 619 (E.D.Va. 2010)).
85.
Kristina Wong & Sean Lengell, DeMint: Law of the Sea Treaty Now Dead,
THE WASHINGTON TIMES (July 16, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2012/jul/16/demint-says-law-sea-treaty-now-dead/?page=all.
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forcing the United States to comply with comprehensive
environmental regulations. 86 In the summer of 2012, thirty-four
senators were staunchly against UNCLOS, which makes reaching the
sixty-seven votes required to ratify the treaty impossible.8 7 ThenSenator John Kerry, when serving as the chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, however, stated that the votes against
UNCLOS only represent a "snapshot of where our politics are in this
instant."8 8 He remains optimistic that the Senate will eventually
ratify UNCLOS. 89 Ratification would enable the United States to
protect its mining rights from interference with other countries as
well as provide U.S. businesses with certainty and stability when
operating on the high seas.90
Irrespective of whether the United States ratifies UNCLOS in
the future, the treaty does not adequately address the issue of piracy
or shipowners' use of PCASP at sea. Although an act of piracy
violates international law under UNCLOS, pirates are typically
prosecuted in domestic jurisdictions. 91 Consequently, successful
prosecutions of pirates require domestic jurisdictions to have a
statute that criminalizes piracy. 92 Because there is currently no
international tribunal prosecuting pirates, the crime flourishes in
domestic jurisdictions that do not actively punish pirates. 9

86.
See id. (listing critiques of UNCLOS).
87.
See id. (noting that UNCLOS "has 34 senators opposed to it and thus lacks
the Senate votes needed for U.S. ratification").
Id.
88.
89.
See id. (quoting a spokeswoman for Senator John Kerry as saying "'[n]o
letter or whip count changes the fact that rock-ribbed Republican businesses and the
military and every living Republican secretary of state say that this needs to happen,
and that's why it's a matter of 'when' not 'if for the Law of the Sea"').
90.
See id. (discussing the arguments for ratification).
91.
Thomas Fedeli, The Rights and Liabilities of Private Actors: Pirates,Master,
and Crew 5 (One Earth Future Foundation, Working Paper, July 2010), available at
http://oneearthfuture.org/sites/learthfuture.org/files//documents/publications/Rights-andLiabilities-Fedeli.pdf (noting that an act of piracy is a violation of international law, but
actual punishment depends on states prosecuting the pirates in domestic courts).
92.
See id. ("[A]bsent widespread and uniform domestic legislation and
enforcement, territorial waters effectively act as safe havens for pirates."). However, it
is possible for states to invoke universal jurisdiction to prosecute pirates. See id. at 6-7
(explaining that universal jurisdiction is a powerful tool but noting how states are still
limited in their ability to apprehend pirates).
93.
See id. at 5 ("It is unlikely that an international court will begin trying
pirates in the near future . . . ."). One of the challenges facing those nations that choose
to prosecute pirates is a severe lack of prison capacity. In fact, over 1,000 pirates in
2011 were serving or awaiting a sentence in twenty countries. Organizations are
attempting to address the lack of prison capacity, but it depends on support from the
international community and Somali authorities. Working Group 2, CONTACT GROUP
ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, http://www.thecgpcs.orgwork.do?
action=workSub2 (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). But see Dire, 680 F.3d at 449 (prosecuting
five Somali pirates for "imprudently launch[ing] an attack on the USS Nicholas').
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Additionally, UNCLOS provides no rules or standards for PCASP
fighting piracy on the high seas.94 Rather, it "grants a very wide
scope for the use of force against piracy by nation states." 95 Thus,
UNCLOS does not adequately address the issue of piracy, which
means that nations-such as the United States-must develop
separate regulatory regimes to manage shipowners' growing use of
PCASP.

B. IMO's Guidance to PMSCs, Shipowners, and Flag
States on PCASP
In 1948, an international conference established the IMO with
the goal of promoting maritime safety. 96 As an agency of the United
Nations, the IMO is responsible for safety and security within the
shipping industry. 9 This responsibility is particularly daunting
considering the fact that over 90 percent of international trade
.traverses Earth's waters.98 The rise of piracy in the Gulf of Aden,
coupled with shipowners' increased use of PCASP, was an important
and urgent issue for the IMO. 9 9 As a result, it developed interim
guidance for PMSCs, shipowners, and flag states at its ninetieth
session, held from the sixteenth to the twenty-fifth of May 2012.100
One of the primary motivations for the IMO's interim guidance was to
address the lack of international standards governing shipowners'
use of PCASP.1 01 The ultimate goal of its guidance was to harmonize
domestic policies for PMSCs across nations operating in the world's
HRAs. 102
1.

IMO's Interim Guidance to PMSCs

The IMO's guidance to PMSCs recognizes that flag states have
the sole discretion to permit PCASP to operate aboard its merchant

Arguably, however, there have been relatively few prosecutions of pirates compared to
the number of piratical attacks.
INT'L GRP. OF P & I CLUBS, PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES-USE OF ARMED
94.
GUARDS ON BOARD NORWEGIAN SHIPS 2 (2011), available at http://www.igpandi.org/
[hereinafter
PROVISIONAL
downloadables/piracy/news/ProvisionalGuidelines.pdf
GUIDELINES] ("However, the Convention on the Law of the Sea provides no basis for
private enforcement.").
95.
Id.
96.
Introduction to IMO, INT'L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/
Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
97.
Id.
See id. (noting that the shipping industry "is perhaps the most
98.
international of the world's industries").
IMO Guidance to PCASP, supra note 17, § 2, Annex § 1.1.
99.
100.
Id. § 3.
101.
Id. at Annex § 1.1.
102.
Id. § 3.
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vessels per Article 92 of UNCLOS. 103 The guidance requests,
however, that PCASP "have a complete understanding of, and fully
comply with, the [flag state's] applicable laws governing the use of
force." 104 While the IMO recognizes the legal authority of the flag
states, it encourages PCASP to use only force that is "strictly
necessary and reasonable" in response to a piratical attack. 05 In
addition, it recommends that firearms only be used in self-defense or
defense of others.106 Finally, the IMO endorses escalation-of-force
procedures for PCASP responding to a piratical attack, which
properly encourages a graduated response toward pirates conducting
an attack. 0 7 Trident Group's actions aboard the Avocet-discussed in
Part I-egregiously failed to meet these minimum standards
advocated by the IMO. 0 8 The PCASP's disproportionate use of force
neither involved a graduated response to the pirates' attack nor force
that was "strictly necessary." 109 This failure highlights the
importance of flag states, such as the United States, creating and
enforcing a policy toward PCASP that limits force in accordance with
the IMO's recommendations.
2.

IMO's Interim Guidance for Shipowners, Ship Operators, and
Shipmasters

The IMO's guidance for shipowners exhibits an overarching
concern for the use of force by PCASP. In discussing the RUF, the
IMO document states:
5.14 PMSC should require their personnel to take all reasonable steps
to avoid the use of force. If force is used, it should be in a manner
consistent with applicable law. In no case should the use of force exceed
what is strictly necessary and reasonable in the circumstances. Care
should be taken to minimize damage and injury and preserve human
life.
5.15 PMSC should require that their personnel not use firearms against
110
persons except in self-defence or defence of others.

103.
Id. at Annex § 1.2 (recognizing that flag states have 'exclusive jurisdiction
on the high seas' per Article 92 of UNCLOS).
104.
Id. at Annex § 5.15.
105.
Id. at Annex § 5.15.3.
106.
Id. at Annex § 5.15.4.
107.
See id. at Annex § 5.15.2 ("[A]ll reasonable steps should be taken to avoid
the use of force and, if force is used, . . . [it] should be used as part of a graduated
response plan . . . .").
108.
See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
109.
IMO Guidance to PCASP, supra note 17, at Annex §5.15.3; see supra notes
2-11 and accompanying text.
110.
Int'l Maritime Org., Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship

Operators and Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security
Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, Annex §§ 5.14-.15, IMO
MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2 (May 25, 2012) [hereinafter IMO Guidance to Shipowners],
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Both 5.14 and 5.15 indicate that one of the IMO's goals is to limit the
use of firearms and deadly force by PCASP. 1" However, absent
clearly enforceable regulations or laws, shipowners are under
immense pressure to acquiesce to PCASP. Despite the IMO's
recognition that "at all times the Master remains in command and
retains the overriding authority on board," the armed guards protect
the ship and its crew. 112 Consequently, shipowners will likely be
reluctant to ensure PCASP adhere to even the spirit of these RUF
absent legally binding domestic standards, especially when there is
considerable room for interpreting what is necessary and reasonable
when facing a piratical attack. Arguably, PMSCs' desire to maintain
a good reputation in the maritime community will motivate them to
respond to attacks proportionately and adhere to restrictive RUF.11 3
In fact, PCASP-for the most part-already act professionally and in
accordance with company-generated RUF at sea, but regulations are
still needed to provide the proper incentives and ensure
compliance.114
The IMO also encourages shipowners to conduct proper due
diligence before hiring PCASP. 115 First, the IMO recommends
shipowners perform a comprehensive risk assessment that considers
a range of issues-from "ship and crew security," and "liability
issues," to "the potential for unforeseen accidents"-before deciding to
use PCASP. 116 The IMO then provides shipowners with criteria for
selecting and vetting PCASP. 117 It proposes that shipowners ask the
PMSC for documentary evidence that demonstrate their employees
have (1) no criminal history; (2) relevant experience; and (3) the
requisite "medical, physical, and mental fitness" to perform the job.118
The IMO also encourages shipowners to ensure that PCASP are
adequately trained."19 It refers to PCASP's professional training as

available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/
Documents/MSC.1-Circ.1405-Rev2.pdf.
111.
See id. (limiting PCASP's use of firearms to self-defense and encouraging
the contractors to find ways to avoid force).
112.
See id. at Annex § 5.9.1 (discussing the recommended "command and
control structure").
113.
See HART, supra note 72 (discussing Hart's values of "integrity, social
responsibility, and an ethical approach"); TRIDENT, supra note 72 (noting that Trident
considers itself "ethical, experienced, capable, [and] professional").
114.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing the companies'
exceptional worldwide reputations).
See IMO Guidance to Shipowners, supra note 110, at Annex § 4.1 ("As with
115.
any other type of contractor, it is important to undertake the usual due
diligence. . . .").
116.
See id. at Annex §§ 3.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.4-.5 (listing the factors and
considerations for conducting a risk assessment regarding the use of PCASP).
117.
Id. at Annex § 4.4.
118.
Id. at Annex § 4.5.
119.
Id. at Annex §§ 4.6-7.
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being of "extreme importance" and lists six criteria-including
medical knowledge, use of force standards, and communication
protocols-for shipowners to use in evaluating a team's competence to
protect a merchant vessel and its crew at sea. 120 These
recommendations provide shipowners with a useful reference to
ensure that they hire only professional, competent, and ethical
PCASP. Yet, absent a domestic policy that demands PCASP meet
these basic standards, shipowners retain broad discretion to hire
PCASP. One general concern is that a shipowner's decision focuses
primarily on cost and not on competence and adequacy. Flag states
are responsible for combating this possibility by prescribing a policy
that ensures PCASP meet the necessary standards for employment.
3.

IMO's Interim Recommendations for Flag States

The IMO encourages flag states to "have in place a policy on
whether or not the use of PCASP will be authorized and, if so, under
which conditions."121 Yet, many nations fail to adequately regulate
PMSCs or prescribe binding RUF for PCASP.122 The IMO requests
that flag states identify minimum requirements for PCASP as well as
a process for authorizing their use. 123 Specifically, the guidance
proposes that a flag state authorize the use of PCASP under
identifiable terms and conditions. 124 The IMO also recommends that
these terms and conditions include an accountability provision that
encourages compliance. 125 Finally, the IMO asks that the flag state's
policy include "reporting and record-keeping requirements" but fails
to list any specific mandates for this provision.1 26 Ultimately, the
IMO's goal is for flag states to address the possibility of violence on
board its ships whenever a shipowner chooses to employ PCASP for
protection.127
The IMO guidance encourages admirable principles among
PCASP, but these are only recommendations. The IMO acknowledges
that its guidance is not legally binding and is not in itself a set of

120.
Id.
121.
Int'l Maritime Org., Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States
Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in
the High Risk Area, Annex § 5, IMO MSC.1/Circ.1406/Rev.1 (Sept. 16, 2011)
[hereinafter IMO Guidance to Flag States], http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/
HotTopics/piracy/Documents/1406-Rev-1.pdf.
122.
See infra Part III.C and notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
123.
IMO Guidance to Flag States, supra note 121, at Annex §§ 5.2.1-.2.
124.
Id. at Annex § 5.2.4.
125.
Id.
126.
Id. at Annex § 5.2.6.
127.
See id. at Annex § 3 ("Flag States should take into account the possible
escalation of violence which could result from the use of firearms and carriage of armed
personnel on board ships when deciding on their policy.").
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certifiable standards. 128 The document also does not define selfdefense or when force is strictly necessary and reasonable. 129 Proper
regulation of PCASP requires practical and enforceable standards. It
is dependent on flag states, such as the United States, to create and
prescribe binding RUF for PCASP-a reality that the IMO guidance
acknowledges.13 0

C. U.S. Regulations for PCASP
On October 15, 2010, Congress authorized funding for the USCG
for fiscal year 2011 by enacting the Coast Guard Authorization Act of
2010 (CGAA).1 31 Section 912 of the CGAA concerns shipowners' use of
force against pirates.132 Section 912(c) states that
[n]ot later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this act, the
secretary of the department in which the coast guard is operating, in
consultation with representatives of industry and labor, shall develop
standard rules for the use of force for self-defense of vessels of the
1 33
United States.

Pursuant to this authority, on July 6, 2011, the USCG affirmed that
Port Security Advisory (3-09) (PSA 3-09) and 33 U.S.C.A. § 383
provided adequate guidance for the use of force against pirates for
U.S.-flagged vessels. 134
Section 383 authorizes U.S. merchant vessels to defend against
piratical attacks, while PSA 3-09 serves as guidance to PCASP and
shipowners operating in HRAs.1 35 In early 2011, the USCG reviewed

128.
IMO Guidance to PCASP, supra note 17, at Annex § 1.5.
129.
See id. at Annex §§ 5.15.2-.4 (encouraging the use of firearms and force
only in self-defense and when necessary and reasonable, but not defining those terms).
130.
See IMO Guidance to Flag States, supra note 121, at Annex § 5 (noting that
flag states need to have a policy in place regarding PCASP).
131.
Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-281, 124 Stat. 2905
(2010). The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112213, 126 Stat. 1540 (codified in scattered sections of 13 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., and
46 U.S.C.), passed Congress on December 14, 2012. This act authorized appropriations
for the USCG for fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Id. § 101. Section 501-Training for use of
force against piracy-recommends that a training curriculum be developed for
merchants' use of force against pirates. 46 U.S.C. § 51705. Specifically, 46 U.S.C.
§ 51705(4) states that the curriculum include "standard rules for the use of force for
self-defense as developed by the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard
is operating under section 912(c) of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010." Since
this section references the CGAA of 2010, this Note focuses on the language of that
CGAA for its analysis of RUF for PCASP and mariners. The recommendation that a
training curriculum be developed in this subsequent CGAA does not change the
analysis nor the recommendation of this Note.
132.
46 U.S.C. § 8107 (2012).
133.
Id.
134.
33 U.S.C. § 383 (2012); Notice of Policy, Self-Defense of Vessels of the
United States, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,411 (July 6, 2011).
135.
33 U.S.C. § 383 (2012); Notice of Policy, Self-Defense of Vessels of the
United States, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,411-13 (July 6, 2011).
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both § 383 and PSA 3-09 to ensure that they provided an "adequate
framework" for addressing merchant vessels' use of force to defend
against piratical attacks.136 The USCG concluded that the current
policy was sufficient after reviewing the eleven public comments it
received.' 3 7 The comments, however, lacked any meaningful reforms,
since many of them supported the current regime and several were
beyond the scope of the USCG's inquiry.'3 8 For example, three of the
comments asked that the United States authorize the use of larger
and more sophisticated weaponry by merchants-including machine
guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and military-style weapons. 139
Another comment was content that the current regulatory framework
"provided sufficient immunity for persons defending vessels." 140
Notably, no comment recommended a certification process for PCASP
involving an international third party nor legally binding RUF as this
Note endorses and discusses in Part IV.B-C.141 Consequently, § 383
and PSA 3-09 continue to serve as the current U.S. policy for
addressing merchant vessels use of force against pirates.142
1.

33 U.S.C.

§ 383

Section 383 authorizes merchant vessels to defend against
piratical attacks on the high seas.14 3 The statute specifies that "[t]he
commander and crew of any merchant vessel ... may oppose and
defend against any aggression" by a nonpublic armed vessel. 144
Notably absent from the statute is any mention of privately armed
contractors.1 45 Although it is possible to consider PCASP as members
of the crew for the purposes of § 383, other international and U.S.
documents distinguish between PCASP and a ship's crew. For
example, the IMO's guidance to shipowners notes that prior to
employing PCASP a thorough risk assessment should be completed

136.
Notice of Policy, Self-Defense of Vessels of the United States, 76 Fed. Reg.
39,411 (July 6, 2011).
137.
Id. at 39,411-12 ("After review of the comments received, the Coast Guard
has determined the policy regarding standard rules for the use of force for self-defense
or defense of others is sufficient.").
138.
See id. at 39,412 (noting that most public comments supported the current
policy on RUF).
139.
Id. at 39,412.
140.
Id.
141.
Id.; see infra Part IV.B-C.
142.
33 U.S.C. § 383 (2012); Notice of Policy, Self-Defense of Vessels of the
United States, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,411-12 (July 6, 2011).
143.
33 U.S.C. § 383 (2012).
144.
Id.
145.
See id. (listing the commander and crew as authorized to defend against
piratical attacks).
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that considers the safety and protection of the crew. 146 The guidance
also encourages frequent information flow between PCASP and a
ship's crew. 14 7 The guidance is implicitly acknowledging that a ship's
crew is separate from PCASP by using a separate term to describe
each. The implicit distinction in these examples demonstrates that a
ship's crew is distinct from PCASP. Even the USCG classifies PCASP
as a separate entity from a ship's organic crew. In PSA 3-09, the
USCG states that "[v]essel masters retain control of and authority
over their vessels, crewmembers, and embarked security personnel at
all times." 14 8 Here, the USCG is using different terms for a ship's
crew and PCASP. As a result, these distinctions raise serious
questions as to whether PCASP are authorized under § 383 to use
force to protect a ship and its crew.
2.

PSA 3-09: Guidance on Self-defense or Defense of Others by
U.S.-Flagged Commercial Vessels Operating in High Risk
Waters
PSA 3-09 is a comprehensive document that defines some rather

illusive terms, such as self-defense, defense of the vessel, and
imminent danger.149 The document discusses when deadly force

should be used during a piratical attack and encourages the use of
nondeadly force.150 Specifically, PSA 3-09 recommends deadly force
only "when an individual has the reasonable belief that the person or
persons to which the deadly force would be directed poses an
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm."151 The document
notes further that deadly force is appropriate only in defense of
life.15 2 Trident Group's use of deadly force against pirates aboard the

146.
See IMO Guidance to Shipowners, supra note 110, at Annex § 3.3.1
(distinguishing implicitly between a ship's crew and PCASP).
147.
See id. at Annex § 5.9.4 (discussing how effective command and control
requires "two-way information flow" between "the shipowner, charterer, PCASP, PMSC
and the ship's master, officers and crew throughout deployment").
148.
Notice of Policy, Self-Defense of Vessels of the United States, 76 Fed. Reg.
39,411, 39,413 (July 6, 2011). Section 912 of the CGAA prevents monetary liability
from attaching when "an owner, operator, time charterer, master, mariner, or
individual" uses force to defend a U.S.-flagged vessel. This broad definition
unequivocally encapsulates PCASP, but because of the inclusion of individual (distinct
from mariner). Id. at 39,411-13.
149.
Id. at 39,412-13. For example, the document defines self-defense or the
defense of others as "the act of thwarting an attack upon oneself, another person, or
both by using force, up to and including deadly force." Id. at 39,412. It classifies
imminent danger as when "an attacker poses an imminent threat of great bodily harm
or death to oneself or others." Id.
150.
See id. at 39,413 ("Nothing in the application of this guidance shall be
construed as to necessarily require personnel to meet force with equal or lesser force.").
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
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Avocet egregiously failed to meet these recommendations. 153 The
Avocet's PCASP also chose not to employ any of the recommended
nondeadly-force tactics provided by PSA 3-09 in its response to the
pirates' attack.154

Trident Group's misuse of force highlights the key problem with
PSA 3-09: no binding RUF. The advisory document acknowledges
that it "does not prescribe rules of engagement."155 Furthermore, the
guidance admits that its recommendations should not be interpreted
to dictate specific actions during a piratical attack.156 As a result,
commanders, crews, and embarked security personnel retain rather
wide discretion to react to an attack as they deem appropriate.15 7 The
danger of allowing PCASP unrestricted latitude in defending
merchant vessels can manifest itself in misuses of force as evidenced
by the Trident Group's "defense" of the Avocet.s5 8 Thus, the United
States' current policy-despite the USCG's approval-fails to provide
the proper framework to ensure that PCASP employ a proportional
amount of force against pirates on the high seas.
3.

PSA 2-09: MARSEC Directive 104-06 and PSA 9-09-Expected
Courses of Action Following Attacks by Pirates in the Horn of
Africa Region

PSA 2-09 provides guidance on the proper security measures
U.S.-flagged vessels should employ when operating in the HRAs.1 59
The notice compiles a number of recommendations for shipowners
traversing pirate-filled waters.160 PSA 2-09 reflects the unclassified
guidance provided to U.S.-flagged vessels in Maritime Security

153.
Id. at 39,412-13; see supranotes 2-11 and accompanying text.
154.
Notice of Policy, Self-Defense of Vessels of the United States, 76 Fed. Reg.
39,411-13 (July 6, 2011); see supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
155.
Notice of Policy, Self-Defense of Vessels of the United States, 76 Fed. Reg.
39,411-12 (July 6, 2011).
156.
Id. ("This guidance should not be read to mandate specific actions at
particular points of time.").
157.
See id. ("Nothing in this document prevents an individual from acting in
self-defense or defense of others."). Arguably, self-defense and defense of others are
legal conceptions that PCASP must comply with while protecting a ship at sea.
However, self-defense and defense of others-as traditionally understood in the United
States-seem rather inapplicable to armed private contractors who traverse the HRAs
and battle pirates. Trident Group's actions aboard the Avocet underscore this point.
Their actions were not in self-defense since the pirates did not fire one shot at them,
the ship, or the crew. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
158.
See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
159.
U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., PORT SEcuRITY ADVISORY-PIRACY (02-09)
(REV 3) (2011), available at https://homeport.uscg.millmycg/portallep/contentView.do?
contentTypeld=2&%20channelId=-18389&contentId=258446&programId=63715
[hereinafter PSA 2-09].
160.
See id. (detailing security measures for U.S.-flagged vessels operating in
the HRAs).
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Directive (1VARSEC) 104-06--a document that analyzes "emerging
security threats" for U.S. vessels.161 PSA 2-09 separates its guidance
into six sections: (1) "Prior to entering [HRAs]"; (2) "During transits of
[HRAs]"; (3) "If anchored in [HRAs]"; (4) "If berthed in [HRAs]"; (5) "If
attacked or boarded"; and (6) "Post incident." 162 These sections
provide minimum standards for U.S. vessels operating in the
HRAs.16 3 Specifically, the postincident section states:
If a vessel is attacked or boarded by pirates, several agencies will
require access to the vessel and crew to conduct a series of
investigations, including but not limited to the [Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)] and USCG...
. The vessel crew is expected to treat
the vessel as a crime scene, preserve any evidence that may be useful to
164
the investigations, and cooperate with investigators.

This section makes it clear that the United States has the authority
to investigate any piratical attacks on U.S.-flagged vessels. 165
Similarly, PSA 9-09 outlines a master and crew's expected courses of
action after a piratical attack in the HRAs.1 66 This guidance requires
vessels to contact the European Union Naval Force as well as the
USCG during and after a piratical attack.167 Thus, the USCG expects
U.S. merchants to notify the proper authorities and provide
government entities access to a ship following an attack at sea.
One of the benefits of both PSA 2-09 and PSA 9-09's
investigatory and reporting requirements is that it enables U.S.
shipowners and PCASP to adapt to new pirate techniques through
shared knowledge. The pirates are a decentralized and adaptable
group that will change their methods in response to merchants' use of
PCASP.16 8 In fact, there are reports that pirates are beginning to buy
advanced weapons from Libya.1 69 These advanced weapons would

161.
See id. (noting that this PSA reflects the most up to date MARSEC
Directive). MARSEC Directive 104-06 is classified as Sensitive Security Information
and is, therefore, not available for public release. However, PSA 2-09 reflects the
unclassified sections of MARSEC Directive 104-06. Notice of Availability, U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., Maritime Security Directive 104-06 (Rev 6), Guidelines for U.S. Vessels
Operating in High Risk Waters, 77 Fed. Reg. 4573 (Jan. 30, 2012).
162.
PSA 2-09, supra note 159.
163.
See id. § 5 (noting that "the following additional security measures must be
implemented by vessel operators").
Id.
164.
165.
Id.
166.
U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., PORT SECURITY ADVISORY-PIRACY (09-09)
(2009), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/PortSecurityAdvisory-0909.pdf [hereinafter PSA 9-09].
167.
Id.
168.
See Shanker, supra note 19 (quoting Vice Admiral Mark I. Fox as saying,
"The pirates are very adaptable, and they are very flexible") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
169.
See Wendell Roelf, Analyst Says Somali PiratesHave New Weapons from
Libya, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/12/us-africa-
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undoubtedly change the nature of the fight at sea because it would
offset the pirates' relative lack of sophistication in comparison to the
well-trained PCASP. The USCG also recognizes the evolving
capabilities of the pirates and states in PSA 2-09 that "[p]irates
continue to adapt to piracy counter measures, moving their
operations further offshore to find targets of opportunity." 170 These
realities underscore the importance of the USCG and FBI's ability to
gather and process information related to piratical attacks and then
distribute that information to shipowners and PMSCs. This
information ensures that PCASP know what types of attacks they are
potentially facing from pirates in the HRAs. Ultimately, the
information allows PCASP to tailor their security training to the new
methods and tactics of the pirates.
PSA 2-09 requires "[nion-lethal methods for repulsing intruders"
as well as "non-lethal means to disrupt, disorient, and deter
boarders." 171 Although these requirements encourage nonlethal
responses to attacking pirates, the document still fails to prescribe
any binding RUF for PCASP.1 72 Neither PSA 2-09 nor PSA 9-09
constrains PCASP's use of force to repel pirates in a manner
consistent with the IMO's recommendations.173
4.

PSA 5-09: Minimum Guidelines for Contracted Security Services
in High Risk Waters and PSA 6-09-Procedures for Obtaining a
Name-Based Terrorism Check for Security Personnel Operating
in High Risk Waters

PSA 5-09 and PSA 6-09 discuss the minimum guidelines for
PCASP and the procedures for obtaining name-based terrorist checks
for PCASP, respectively.174 Both documents ensure that shipowners
only utilize PCASP who pass a security check conducted by the U.S.

pirates-idUSBRE83BOHO20120412?goback=%2Egde_4018080_member_115402076
(concluding that Somali pirates have purchased mines and shoulder-held missile
launchers from Libya).
170.
PSA 2-09, supra note 159, § 3.
171.
Id. § 5.
172.
See id. (noting that these are mandatory protocols but failing to establish
binding RUF).
173.
See supra Part III.B.
174.
U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., PORT SEcURITY ADVISORY-PIRACY (05-09)
(REV 1) (2009), available at https://homeport.uscg.milmycg/portal/ep/contentView.do?
contentTypeld=2&channelll=18389&contentId=189984&programId=63715
[hereinafter PSA 5-09]; U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., PORT SECURITY ADVISORYPIRACY (06-09) (REV 1) (2011), available at https://homeport.uscg.millmycg/
portallep/contentView.do?contentTypeld=2&channelld=18389&contentId=290042&pro
gramld=63715 [hereinafter PSA 6-09].
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Department of Homeland Security. 175 PSA 5-09 requires that PCASP
"possess the training, understanding, and capability to effectively
defend the vessel and crew." 176 33 C.F.R. § 104.220, which covers
company or vessel personnel with security duties, outlines the
specifics of PSA 5-09's provision and includes general training
requirements for private contractors-including that PCASP remain
"[k]nowledge[able] of current security threats and patterns."17 7 The
guidance lists an assortment of expectations for PCASP but places
the responsibility of ensuring compliance with these standards on the
shipowner. 178 The guidelines are also devoid of any specific
mechanism to ensure that PCASP have met the listed
requirements. 179 As this Note proposes in Part IV.C, the United
States could benefit from a requirement that PCASP obtain
certification from a third-party organization. 180 This outside
certification process would ensure that PCASP meet the prescribed
standards and expectations outlined in PSA 5-09 and 33 C.F.R.

§ 104.220.
PSA 6-09 simply describes the procedure for obtaining a security
check for a privately armed contractor. 181 This check ensures that
shipowners do not employ an individual who poses a security threat
to the United States. 1 82 It also serves as an important screening
mechanism for PMSCs, since it ensures that the PMSCs employ
properly vetted personnel. The check does not, however, provide a
mechanism to verify that the PCASP are well trained or competent
enough to perform their mission at sea. As this Note proposes in Part
IV.C, proper certification of PCASP requires, among other things, an
on-site verification of the team's operational methods.18 3 Absent any
type of independent audit of the PCASP's methods and training, it is
difficult to ensure that shipowners only employ PCASP who will
abide by a flag state's laws.

175.
See PSA 5-09, supra note 174, § 1 (noting that PCASP "must possess a
[Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)]"); PSA 6-09, supra note 174,
§ 1 (outlining the procedures for PCASP to obtain a TWIC).
176.
PSA 5-09, supra note 174, § 7.
177.
Id. at n.vi (citing training requirements for company or vessel personnel
with security duties, 33 C.F.R. § 104.220 (2010)).
178.
See id. (informing vessels of the requirements for PCASP).
179.
Id.
180.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
181.
PSA 6-09, supra note 174.
182.
See id. ("TSA will determine whether or not an individual poses or is
suspected of posing a security threat and report positive results to the Coast Guard.").
183.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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D. Norwegian Regulationsfor PCASP
Norway effectively manages the employment of private
contractors at sea with a detailed and comprehensive regulatory
regime. 184 In fact, Norway's regime was one of the catalysts for the
IMO's recommendations as previously discussed, supra Part III.B.185
Norway decided to regulate PCASP in order "to ensure that the
highest possible professional and ethical standards are followed in
connection with the use of such services on vessels registered in
Norway."1 86 Norway's regulatory framework for PCASP consists of
the Regulations of 22 June 2004 No. 972 (Security Regulations),
which Norway's Maritime Directorate passed pursuant to its
authority under the Act of 16 February 2007 No. 9.187 Norway's
regulatory regime properly manages its shipowners' use of PCASP.
One of the strengths of Norway's regulatory framework for
PCASP is that it has a role in a vessel's selection and employment of
private contractors.' 8 8 Under § 20 of the Security Regulations, the
Norwegian Maritime Directorate must be notified prior to a ship
selecting armed guards for protection.' 8 9 The agency requires not
only that the vessel describe why armed guards are needed but also
provide detailed evidence of the suitability of the PMSC and its
guards. 90 The agency also retains authority to deny the use of armed
guards aboard a ship if "a specific security company cannot be
regarded as suitable for use on Norwegian-registered ships."' 9 ' In
contrast to the United States, Norway retains rather broad discretion
to approve or disapprove of a shipowners' selection of PMSCS. 192 This
discretion forces Norway's shipping companies to perform proper due

184.
See PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 1 (noting that Norway
decided to regulate PCASP to ensure that its ships are adequately protected at sea).
185.
See id. ("In preparing the guidelines, the IMO has relied on, among others,
the standards of . .. DNK.").

186.
Id.
187.
Id. Norway also regulates PCASP under the Regulations of 25 June 2009
No. 904 (the Firearms Regulations). The Firearms Regulations concerns "firearms,
firearm parts and ammunition" used by PCASP on board Norway's vessels. Id. This
Article will primarily focus on the use of force on board Norway's ships as it relates to
the Security Regulations and the Act of 16 February 2007 No. 9.
188.
Norwegian Maritime Directorate, Regulations of 22 June 2004 No. 972
Concerning Security, Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Piracy Measures and the Use of Force
on Board Ships and Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (The Security Regulations) Ch. 5,
§ 20 [hereinafter Security Regulations], available at http://www.sjofartsdir.no/
GloballUlykker-og-sikkerhet/Pirater%20-%20ISPS%20security/Regulations%20
concerning%20amendments%20to%20the%2ORegulation%200f%2022%2OJune%202004
%20nr.972.pdf; PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 7-8.
189.
Security Regulations, supranote 188, at Ch. 5, § 20(2).
190.
Id.
191.
Id. at Ch. 5, § 20(4).
192.
Compare id. at Ch. 5, § 20 (listing selection criteria for Norwegian vessels
to employ when choosing a security firm and its guards), with supra Part III.C.4.
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diligence when selecting a PMSC, in accordance with the IMO's
guidance to shipowners as discussed in Part III.B.2.193 This due
diligence ensures that Norwegian merchants only employ PCASP
that adhere to high standards of professionalism. 194
Section 17 of the Security Regulations describes Norway's use of
force provisions. 195 This section limits PCASP's use of force to threats
that are
"direct, immediate,
significant
and
otherwise
unavoidable."196 The provision requires that force be avoided when
possible and demands that the use of force be "reasonably
proportionate" in relation to the threat.1 9 7 This limiting and narrow
language stands in stark contrast to the United States' qualified
language in PSA 3-09. 198 The most striking difference between
Norway and the United States' framework, however, is found in
§ 17(3) of the Security Regulations, which provides that "[t]he
unlawful use of force may result in criminal liability." 199 This
provision provides a strong incentive for PCASP to use reasonable
and proportionate force when combating pirates in order to avoid
criminal sanctions. 200 Section 17(3) provides Norway's regulatory
regime with legitimate authority in contrast to PSA 3-09, which
contains a myriad of legal disclaimers. 20 1
Another strength of Norway's guidelines is that it demands an
escalation of force against a piratical attack. 202 Norway has
interpreted its use of force provisions in § 17 of the Security
Regulations to mean that "less radical measures must be attempted
before force may be employed."2 0 3 Section 24 on the use of firearms
further supports Norway's escalation-of-force requirement by noting

193.
See PROVIsIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 7 (noting that the Security
Regulations require companies to perform a "detailed assessment" of PMSCs and that
"IMO guidelines should be followed wherever possible").
194.
See id. at 7 (acknowledging that "[t]here is reason to believe that not all of
the security firms have the necessary expertise and credibility required to perform the
demanding task of providing armed guard services in high risk areas").
195.
Security Regulations, supranote 188, at Ch. 4, § 17.
196.
Id. at Ch. 4, § 17(2).
197.
Id.
198.
Compare id. at Ch. 4, § 17 (limiting PCASP's use of force to direct threats
and demanding a proportionate response to a piratical attack), with supra Part III.C.2
(discussing PSA 3-09's legal disclaimers).
199.
Security Regulations, supra note 188, at Ch. 4, § 17(3).
200.
Id. PCASP would likely want to comply with § 17 to avoid punishment
under Norway's General Civil Penal Code (Act of 22 May 1902 No. 10).
201.
Compare id. (noting that "unlawful use of force may result in criminal
liability"), with supra Part III.C.2 (noting that PSA 3-09 does not "prescribe rules of
engagement" and should not be read to dictate certain actions at certain points in
time).
202.
See PROVIsIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 12 (interpreting Norway's
regulation that force must be avoided whenever possible to mean that "less radical
measures must be attempted before force may be employed").
203.

Id.
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that attacking pirates must be warned by light, sound signals, or
warning shots. 204 These sections highlight Norway's overarching
commitment to shipowners using PCASP as a last resort and only to
supplement other less aggressive onboard security measures. 205
Similar to the United States, Norway requires any ship that is
attacked by pirates and employs force in response to report the
incident to the relevant governmental authority. 206 In fact, Norway
requires its ships to report any attacks within seventy-two hours to
the Norwegian Maritime Directorate. 207 If an attack results in death
or personal injury, Norway requires the submission of a report to the
Norwegian National Criminal Investigation Service. 208 Norway also
recommends that PCASP or shipowners record their confrontations
with pirates through sound or video recordings. 209 This information
enables Norwegian authorities to analyze PCASP's employment of
firearms and conduct a thorough investigation of the incident. 210 The
notification requirement in § 18 of Norway's Security Regulations
serves the same function as the notification requirement in PSA 2-09
for the United States-enable a thorough and comprehensive
investigation by the necessary governmental agencies after a piratical
attack.
Despite Norway's rather restrictive regulations for PCASP, it
still provides shipowners and private contractors adequate discretion
when faced with an imminent piratical attack on the high seas. 211
Norway provides a master with "significant discretion" in
determining how to address a threat when facing an unclear and
dangerous situation at sea. 2 1 2 This provision is important because
fighting a decentralized, adaptable group of pirates demands a
variety of responses. 213 This caveat, however, demonstrates the
ultimate strength of Norway's regulatory regime-balancing the need

204.
Security Regulations, supra note 188, at Ch. 5, § 24(3) ("If the
circumstances permit, the attacker(s) shall be warned by means of light and sound
signals and the firing of warning shots.").
205.
See PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 12 (noting that PCASP are
"a supplement to other, passive security measures, and not .. . a replacement for
them").
206.
Security Regulations, supra note 188, at Ch. 4, § 18(1).
207.
Id.
Id. at Ch. 4, § 18(2).
208.
209.
PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 13.
210.
See id. (noting that the reporting requirement has two goals: "one is to
provide the Norwegian authorities with information about the use of firearms on board
ships registered in Norway; the other is to support any subsequent investigation").
211.
See PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 12 (noting that a
shipmaster may "exercise significant discretion" in the face of uncertainty).
212.
Id.
See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
213.
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for the use of force against the seriousness of the circumstances. 214
Norway is able to effectively balance these competing forces by
adequately regulating the selection and employment of PCASP and
by prescribing binding RUF. 215 As a result, Norway ensures that
violence is only used as a last resort when confronting pirates at sea.
IV. RESOLVING THE UNITED STATES' INADEQUATE
REGULATION OF

PCASP

A. The Need for Binding RUF in the United States
The United States must address the absence of any binding RUF
for PCASP in order to prevent disproportionate and unreasonable
uses of force by private contractors. 216 Arguably, the United States
has a moral obligation to address the shortcomings in its regulations
because it has officially endorsed the use of PCASP on board its
vessels. 217 Both former-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and
Assistant-Secretary Andrew J. Shapiro have encouraged the use of
PCASP as an invaluable protective measure for ships and crews. 218
The moral dimension of this responsibility encapsulates a duty to the
pirates themselves, since many of them are simple pawns of the
major pirate ringleaders in Somalia and Yemen. 219 The pirate
"kingpins" reap the rewards of the captured crew's ransom and suffer
See PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 12 (recognizing that a
214.
ship's response to a piratical attack must be "balanced against the seriousness of the
situation one faces").
See supra Part III.D.
215.
See, e.g., supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text; see also Richard, supra
216.
note 2, at 415-16 (recommending "additional controls" for private security and noting
that "[a]ny use of private actors in anti-piracy operations must involve safeguards
against abuse").
See Shapiro, supra note 19 (noting that the State Department has "recently
217.
demarched countries to permit the use of privately contracted armed security
personnel on commercial vessels"); Robert Young Pelton, US to Promote Use of Armed
Guards on Vessels, SOMALIAREPORT (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.somaliareport.com/
index.php/post/1956 (noting that a State Department memorandum directly from
Secretary Clinton encouraged the use of PCASP to deter pirating).
See Shapiro, supra note 19 (noting that no ship employing PCASP has been
218.
hijacked); Pelton, supra note 217 (discussing how Secretary Clinton advocated to
American diplomats to encourage other countries to permit PCASP on board their
merchant vessels); see also Richard, supra note 2, at 413-14 (discussing Representative
Ron Paul's (R-Tex.) encouragement of private companies to address piracy on the high
seas).
See Pirate Kingpins, supra note 42 (quoting U.N. Monitoring Group on
219.
Somalia, Letter dated July 12, 2012 from the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2012/544 (July 12, 2012)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) ("As a result, the international community is investing enormous resources to
pursue and punish those at the bottom of the piracy pyramid .. . while virtually
guaranteeing impunity for those at the top of the piracy pyramid who bear the greatest
responsibility and profit the most .... ).
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none of the ill effects of piracy-battling the well-armed, well-trained,
and well-equipped PCASP. 220 Moreover, as numerous scholars have
argued, employing private security-in any arena-poses significant
risks, such as abuses of force or further destabilizing the local
community. 221 Thus, the United States must reform its current policy
on RUF to ensure that U.S.-flagged ships and PCASP act with a
respect for human life when operating on the high seas.
B. USCG Should Promulgate Binding RUFfor PCASP
The United States should create binding RUF for PCASP that
impose administrative penalties if violated. 222 In § 383, the United
States authorized its shipmasters to use force against piratical
attacks. 223 Congress delegated authority to the USCG to promulgate
rules regarding the RUF in the CGAA. 22 4 Consequently, the USCG
has administrative authority to publish binding regulations on
merchants and PCASP. 2 25 Under this authority, the United States
should adopt binding RUF modeled after Norway's Security
Regulations. Specifically, the United States' regulations should limit
PCASP's use of force to threats that are "direct, immediate,
significant and otherwise unavoidable." 226 Another piece of the
regulation should demand "reasonably proportionate" responses to
piratical attacks-necessitating a graduated response from PCASP

220.
See id. (noting the relatively limited investigation into the piracy network
in Somalia).
221.
See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 44, at 47-48 ("There is also uncertainty
surrounding the rules of engagement and ultimately, how the companies would be held
accountable for the excessive use of force. The lack of transparency and public
oversight of the operations and business practices of private security companies adds to
the discomfort, raising the question of whether vessel security should remain the
domain of navies, rather than shift to a profit-motivated private sector."); Parsons,
supra note 55, at 177-78 ("Despite the potential benefits for shippers in using PSCs on
board vessels, there are also many risks."); Richard, supra note 2, at 451-64
(discussing the risks of using PMSCs); Grace Rodden & James Walsh III, The Legal
Issues of PrivateArmed Security on Commercial Ships, 58 FED. LAW., May 2011, at 30,
33-34 (discussing the international legal community's concerns with using private
security contractors).
222.
See James H. Hohenstein, Private Security Companies at Sea: Unseen and
Unregulated 18 (Int'l Bar Ass'n, Mar. & Transp. L. Comm., Oct. 18, 2007), available at
http://www.hklaw.com/files/Publication/ld2d9a5-b99c-4f4e-bbef-la32fOl8ef7c/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e929a6d0-8519-4053-a3e8-ceeeal74d8a2/
46410.PDF (recommending that flag states adopt "standard rules of engagement" that
include "penalties for infractions").
223.
33 U.S.C. § 383 (2012).
Notice of Policy, Self-Defense of Vessels of the United States, 76 Fed. Reg.
224.
39,411 (July 6, 2011).
See id. (noting that the USCG reviewed its policy "for the use of force for
225.
self-defense of vessels of the United States" per the CGAA).
Security Regulations, supra note 188, at Ch. 4, § 17(2).
226.
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with deadly force as the last resort. 22 7 Finally, the regulation must
have a section that recognizes that unlawful deviations from the RUF
will result in administrative penalties and possible referral of the
incident to federal prosecutors. 2 28 This final provision is the key,
since it ensures that the regulations will be followed. The goal of the
regulation's sanction provision is to deter misconduct on the high
seas. The sanction provision places PCASP on notice that there are
possible consequences for intentional, reckless, and negligent uses of
force on the high seas, which will incentivize their compliance with
the U.S. regulations. Additionally, PMSCs will ensure that their
PCASP comply with the RUF to maintain the security company's
reputation in the private-contracting community. Thus, in order to
hold PCASP accountable for their actions at sea, legal disclaimerslike the ones found in PSA 3-09-must be removed. 229
These binding RUF not only comply with the IMO's guidance but
also set a positive example for other nations struggling with the
decision to endorse, prohibit, or regulate PCASP. 230 After
promulgating this regulation for PMSCs and PCASP, the United
States could take an active role in encouraging other nations to adopt
similar guidelines. These recommended RUF comply with the IMO's
guidance that contractors utilize force only in situations when it is
"strictly necessary and reasonable." 23 1 Moreover, the recommended
RUF fulfills the IMO's request for flag states to publish a policy that
addresses minimum standards for PCASP.2 32 Additionally, a binding
RUF regulation provides clarity to shipmasters and shipowners,
which is an express goal of the IMO's guidance to flag states.23 3 Most
importantly, this regulation meets the United States' moral
obligation of ensuring proper protocols are in place for a private
security force it actively encourages. 234 If the United States were to
adopt binding RUF and create a regulatory framework for PCASP

Id. The escalation-of-force protocols could be based on best practices in the
227.
industry. See generally BMP4, supra note 38 (discussing the best practices for
defending against piratical attacks off the coast of Somalia). They need not necessarily
dictate a specific course of action at a certain time but mandate a graduated response
during a piratical attack.
Security Regulations, supra note 188, at Ch. 4, § 17(3).
228.
229.
See supra Part III.C.2.
230.
See supra Part III.B.
See IMO Guidance to PCASP, supra note 17, at Annex §§ 3.8, 5.15.3 (noting
231.
that PMSCs should have the operational competence and professional capability to
perform their mission at sea).
See IMO Guidance to Flag States, supra note 121, at §§ 5.2-. 1 (noting that
232.
flag states should establish a policy that includes "the minimum criteria or minimum
requirements with which PCASP should comply").
Id. § 3 ("Flag States should provide clarity to Masters ... with respect to
233.
the national policy on carriage of armed security personnel.").
See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
234.
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similar to Norway, then it would signal to other nations the
importance of properly regulating armed contractors at sea.
Arguably, binding RUF suffers from some notable shortcomings.
One major concern is that exceptions that allow for limited PCASP
and shipowner discretion in response to a piratical attack will
swallow the rule. For example, PCASP could repeatedly claim that a
situation was unclear and deadly force was required immediately.
However, investigators should be able to draw distinctions between
attacks where PCASP properly employed the RUF and where
discretion was needed in a response. Similarly, soldiers must make
comparable split-second decisions in combat situations. Military
investigators are able to analyze these scenarios and evaluate a
soldier's use of the RUF to determine whether he or she acted in
accordance with applicable law. 235
Another critique is that PSA 3-09 simply restates existing law in
the area, which is based on self-defense. 236 How can you bind
someone's inherent right of self-defense through RUF? There is a
distinction, however, between the employment of self-defense-as a
legal concept and in actual scenarios-on U.S. soil and at sea.23 7
PCASP carry automatic weapons and protect a ship and its cargo in
an area that has been characterized as a "war-zone." 238 These facts
stand in stark contrast to the self-defense situations that arise in U.S.
communities. PCASP still need discretion when responding to
piratical attacks, but binding RUF provides the proper framework to
evaluate their response. Applying only the concept of self-defense to
PCASP operating at sea ignores the significant issues that arise when
pirates and private contractors clash. In the context of the United
States' fight against al-Qaeda and the use of drones, President
Obama made a particularly relevant comment in his National
Security Address at the National Defense University on May 23,
2013:
And yet, as our fight enters a new phase, America's legitimate claim of
self-defense cannot be the end of the discussion. To say a military tactic
is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every

235.
See generally HEADQUARTERS DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 15-6:
PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS (2006)
(discussing the "procedures for investigations and boards of officers not specifically
authorized by any other directive").
236.
See Notice of Policy, Self-Defense of Vessels of the United States, 76 Fed.
Reg. 39,411, 39,412 (July 6, 2011) ("This document restates existing law in this area. It
does not establish new standards or duties with respect to the right of self-defense or
defense of others. The examples provided herein are included merely to illustrate how
the outlined principles could apply to the issue of piracy.") (emphasis added).

237.
See Brittany E. Pizor, Lending an "Invisible Hand" to the Navy: Armed
Guards as a Free Market Assistance to Defeating Piracy, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L.
545, 558-61 (2012) (comparing the self-defense policies of different countries).
238.
See supra discussion Part II and note 57 and accompanying text.
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instance. For the same human progress that gives us the technology to
strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that
power-or risk abusing it. And that's why, over the last four years, my
administration has worked vigorously to establish a framework that
governs our use of force against terrorists-insisting upon clear
239
guidelines, oversight and accountability .

If it is important "to establish a framework that governs our use of
force against terrorists," then it is important to do the same for
private contractors-whose use the United States encourages-when
battling pirates. 240 This quote also demonstrates that self-defense
should not be the sole answer since U.S. technology and power
typically supersede that of our adversaries. 24 1 As a result, the concept
of self-defense is insufficient for constraining PCASP's use of force at
sea.
The regulations may also meet with some resistance from the
PMSC community. The security contractors may express concern that
these regulations will limit their ability to protect the ship and its
crew. However, the regulations could include-similar to Norwayrecognition that unknown and precarious situations will afford the
shipmaster, crew, and PCASP discretion in its response. 24 2 There also
appear to be some individual contractors who would welcome the
adequate regulation of their field, since proper regulation and RUF
add a dimension of authority and legitimacy to the private security
profession. 24 3
Another issue with binding RUF is the inherent difficulty in
prosecuting PCASP for misuses of force. Since the crime would occur
thousands of miles away from the United States, 244 it would be
challenging to conduct a proper and thorough investigation as well as
gather eyewitness accounts from the pirates and crew. PSA 2-09,
however, requires that shipowners treat the vessel as a crime scene
after piratical attacks. 245 It also demands that the USCG and FBI
have access to the vessel following an attack.2 46 These requirements
enable the proper governmental entities to conduct investigations
despite the considerable obstacles. It is important to note that these

239.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National
at
(transcript
available
online
University
(May
23,
2012)
Defense
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-nationaldefense-university) [hereinafter President Obama's Speech].
240.
Id.; see discussion supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
241.
See President Obama's Speech, supra note 239 ("And yet, as our fight
enters a new phase, America's legitimate claim of self-defense cannot be the end of the
discussion."); see also discussion supraPart II.
242.
See supra Part III.D.
See Hackwood, supra note 49 (discussing that the "rules of engagement are
243.
clear" and describing an escalation of force protocol for dealing with a piratical attack).
244.
See infra Appendix I.
245.
See supra Part III.C.3.
246.
Id.
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investigations must address both the pirate side of the attack and the
PCASP's response to that attack. Ultimately, the USCG and FBI
should ensure that PCASP properly complied with U.S. regulations
on the RUF during the attack.
Additionally, altering U.S. regulations for PCASP might
incentivize a race to the bottom. 24 7 This unfortunate outcome is
commonplace in an international environment where standards differ
substantially across nations. 248 For example, Japan currently
prohibits the use of armed guards, while Belgium, the Bahamas, and
Isle of Man have rather limited provisions with almost no oversight of
PCASP. 24 9 Some nations, such as Italy and France, endorse the use of
military personnel to protect a ship and its crew at sea.25 0 Standards
for regulating PCASP span the continuum from very restrictive laws
(Norway) to almost no regulation (Isle of Man). 251 The diversity of
approaches to regulating PCASP demonstrates the important role
domestic policy plays in governing ships' use of private contractors.
The ultimate fear is that PMSCs will vacate the United States
once the USCG promulgates these regulations and move to nations
where PCASP are less strenuously regulated. 252 The United States,
however, is a major market for the shipping industry and private
maritime security. 253 It is unlikely that the costs of compliance would
outweigh the potential benefits of remaining in the United States and
providing contracting services to major commercial shipping
247.
See Laws and Guns, supra note 19 (noting that an increase in regulation of
PMSCs could result in firms "simply mov[ing] to territories with less demanding
regimes").
248.
See supra Part III.B-D.
249.
Comparison of Flag State Laws, supra note 23. Japan has a general
prohibition against the use of PCASP. Id. It prohibits the possession and use of arms
and swords under the Japanese Firearms and Swords Control law. Id. Belgium does
not have a provision in its national legislation for the use of armed guards, but the
Belgian Authority is expected to take steps in the near future to permit the use of
PCASP. Id. The Bahamas leaves the decision to employ PCASP to the shipowner after
considering the advantages and disadvantages of having armed guards on board. Id.
250.
Id. Italy has an agreement between its Defense Ministry and Shipping
Association that "10 teams of six military personnel will be available for Italianregistered vessels." Id. The French government authorizes PCASP when military
protection is not available. Id. For a full discussion of Italy's antipiracy efforts, see
Francesca Pellegrino, Historical and Legal Aspects of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Shipping, 43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 429, 444-45 (2012).
251.
See Comparison of Flag State Laws, supra note 23 (discussing regulations
in the Isle of Man); see supra Part III.D.
252.
See Comparison of Flag State Laws, supra note 23 (noting that in the
Bahamas and the Isle of Man the decision to use PCASP is up to the shipowner with
limited government regulation); Laws and Guns, supra note 19 (fearing that two tiers
may emerge in the maritime security industry-one that is regulated and one that
operates by improvisation).
253.
See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 44, at 43 (noting that "approximately
50,000 vessels pass through the Gulf of Aden each year, transporting cargo that
includes 12% of the world's daily oil supply").
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companies. Moreover, contractors would not be able to locate in
another country and provide services to U.S.-based shipowners
without complying with U.S. regulations because they would apply to
any PMSC employed by U.S.-flagged vessels. 254 Thus, it is unlikely
that PMSCs will vacate the United States because of binding RUF.

C. Mandated Certificationfor PMSCs by an International
Organization
U.S. regulations for PCASP should also require that all PMSCs
provide proper evidence that they have been certified from a suitable
international organization. 25 5 This nonwaivable requirement must
acknowledge that the USCG has final approval or disapproval
authority of any PMSC selected for use by a U.S.-flagged vessel-akin
to Norway's provision in its Security Regulations. 2 56 This enables the
USCG to effectively screen a shipowner's decision to utilize the
services of a PMSC.
One example of an organization that conducts PMSC
certification is the Security Association for the Maritime Industry
(SAMI). 25 7 This global organization certifies PMSCs through a threestep process. 258 First, SAMI performs a thorough review of the
PMSCs' records. 259 Second, SAMI conducts an on-site audit that tests
the "implementation, readiness, conduct of operations, personnel
management, [and] logistics" of the PMSC. 260 This step involves
comparing the PMSCs' performance against SAMI's internationally
accepted standards. 261 The last step is an operational site visit to
evaluate the PMSCs' operational capabilities in the field. 262 SAMI
verifies that a PMSC is reputable by "provid[ing] reassurance,
guidance, and minimum quality and standards in the delivery of

254.
See supra Part III.C.3.
255.
See Hohenstein, supra note 222, at 18 (recommending that "an
international, not-for-profit organization ... govern and approve PSCs"); see also Pizor,
supra note 237, at 568 (arguing that "a regulatory board could issue the armed guard
with a license to serve as security on a merchant ship").
256.
See supra Part III.D.
257.
See SEC. ASS'N FOR THE MARITIME INDUS., http://www.seasecurity.org/ (last
visited Dec. 20, 2013); LloydsListGroup, Peter Cook, Secretariat, Security Association
for the Maritime Industry, YoUTUBE (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-09JGa38qy3I [hereinafter Peter Cook Interview].
258.
Peter Cook Interview, supra note 257, at 2:10; SAMI Certification for
PMSCs, SEC. AsS'N FOR THE MARITIME INDUS., http://www.seasecurity.org/samicertification-for-pmscs/ [hereinafter SAMI Certification](last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
259.
See Peter Cook Interview, supra note 257, at 2:15 (noting that the first-stage
of the three-stage process is due diligence); SAMI Certificationsupra note 258 (noting
that Stage 1 is a due-diligence step).
260.
SAMI Certification,supra note 258.
261.
See id. ("Stage 2 is the [sic] where the companies [sic] performance will be
assessed against the standard.").
262.
Id.
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maritime security." 263 The standards SAMI espouses provide
legitimacy to the PMSCs that wish to provide maritime security
services. 264
Mandatory certification of all PMSCs has notable benefits. First,
the USCG will be able to ensure that merchants only use PMSCs that
have been vetted by an independent organization that actually
observes the PMSCs' methods in the field. There is ample evidence
that many private-contracting companies do not have the necessary
expertise and credibility to provide security services to vessels in the
HRAs.265 The certification requirement acts as a filter for merchants
to ensure that they only hire suitable PMSCs. Third-party
organizations, such as SAMI, facilitate the accreditation process
between the private contractor, shipping company, and flag state. 266
This regulation would also meet the IMO's requirement that PCASP
provide documentary evidence of their competencies to provide
security on the high seas. 26 7 It ultimately ensures that PCASP are
properly selected, vetted, and trained as the IMO's guidance
encourages. 268 Finally, private organizations that certify PMSCs will
save the USCG from having to conduct any type of on-site
certification process. The USCG may not have the resources, training,
or expertise necessary to conduct this type of certification process. 269
Certifying PMSCs is SAMI's market niche however, and utilizing
their services would save the U.S. government the nontrivial cost of
having to provide and train personnel with the skills and knowledge
necessary to conduct a complex certification process. 270 Although the
U.S. government would be outsourcing an important aspect of

263.
Id.
264.
See id. ("Through the SAMI Standard the association will provide the
maritime industry with a credible measure of competency giving them confidence in
the professionalism of the maritime security industry.").
265.
See PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 94, at 7-8 (justifying Norway's
requirement that merchants perform a detailed assessment of PMSCs prior to each
assignment).
266.
See Peter Cook Interview, supra note 257, at 1:42 (discussing SAMI's role in
the PMSC accreditation process).
267.
See IMO Guidance to PCASP, supra note 17, at Annex § 3.2 (listing
"incorporation, management and financial standing" documents as relevant to PMSC
due diligence).
268.
See id. at Annex §§ 4.1-.4 (providing recommendations for PCASP
selection, vetting, and training); see also IMO Guidance to Shipowners, supra note 110,
at Annex §§ 4.1-4.7.6 (listing PMSC selection criteria for shipowners).
269.
See Richard, supra note 2, at 414 ("Governments frequently lack the
resources or political will to provide security, training, and technical security
equipment necessary for dealing with modern threats, creating opportunities for the
private sector."). There is a chance, of course, that organizations will "rubber stamp" a
PMSC for use on board a U.S. flagged-vessel. Proper due diligence by the USCG,
however, could overcome this concern.
270.
See generally Peter Cook Interview, supra note 257 (discussing the
certification process for PMSCs).
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regulating PMSCs, proven certification companies are in the best
position in the industry to evaluate and grade the tactical and
technical skills of PCASP. 27 1 Moreover, the backstop to the regulatory
framework is the binding RUF.
Arguably, PSA 5-09 and PSA 6-09 already adequately regulate
the selection and vetting of PMSCs for U.S.-flagged vessels.2 72 The
advisories do ensure that PCASP pass proper background checks and
require that PCASP meet certain minimum requirements as detailed
in 33 C.F.R. § 104.220.273 The deficiency, however, is that there is no
verification or independent observation of the PCASP's methods in
the field. In contrast, SAMI and other-related organizations certify
that PCASP are adequately trained to protect a ship at sea.274 This
independent verification of PCASP will ensure that U.S.-flagged
vessels only utilize professional and competent private security
companies.
V. CONCLUSION

Although piracy has recently declined off the horn of Africa, it
will continue to pose a significant threat to commercial ships
traversing the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. Somalia and Yemen
provide the perfect combination of socioeconomic and governmental
failures that enable piracy to thrive. Additionally, recent reports
indicate that piracy is on the rise in other parts of the globeincluding Indonesia and Southeast Asia. 275 These realities coupled
with shrinking defense budgets mean that PCASP will have a notable
role in protecting shipowners in the twenty-first century. Since
PCASP will play a substantial role in protecting shipowners, the
United States has a moral obligation to properly regulate them at
sea. The Trident Group incident demonstrates the danger of allowing
private contractors to remain relatively unregulated. To address
these issues, the USCG should use its authority under the CGAA to
promulgate binding RUF for PCASP.
Regulations for PCASP vary substantially across nations. The
Bahamas and Isle of Man have rather limited provisions in place for
armed guards, while Italy prefers its vessels to utilize military
personnel. The United States has a framework for PCASP's use of
force that primarily consists of § 383 and PSA 3-09. This regime,

271.
See generally id. (discussing SAMI's expertise in certifying PMSCs).
272.
See supra Part III.C.4.
273.
PSA 5-09, supra note 174, § 7 (citing training requirements for company or
vessel personnel with security duties, 33 C.F.R. § 104.220 (2010)).
274.
See supra notes 257-64 and accompanying text.
275.
See Drop in Piracy, supra note 14 (noting the spike in piracy in Indonesia
and Southeast Asia for 2012).
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however, suffers from legal disclaimers and a lack of specificity
regarding the RUF. In contrast, Norway's RUF are specific and
restrictive. Norway's regime enables the Norwegian Maritime
Directorate to adequately supervise and control the employment of
PCASP on board its nation's vessels.
This Note proposes that the United States adopt binding RUF for
PCASP modeled on Norway's Security Regulations. Under its
statutory authority, the USCG should promulgate regulations that (1)
dictate binding RUF for PCASP and (2) require mandatory
certification of PMSCs by an international, private organization.
PCASP fill a significant gap for shipowners who need to be protected
at sea but can no longer depend on an international community that
is facing widespread military budget cuts. These men and women
perform a necessary job that involves putting their lives at risk on a
daily basis for the protection of a ship and its crew. This Note is not
meant to disparage their profession or minimize their sacrifices.
Rather, this Note's proposed solution would incentivize the proper
behavior by armed contractors at sea and ensure that they act with a
respect for human rights while protecting U.S. vessels.
Sean PatrickMahard276
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